Introduction
After eight years the American president is stepping down. His tenure has been eventful, dividing opinion at home and abroad as a result of both controversial domestic and foreign policies. As the media shifts focus to the next administrative line-up the attention of historians, political commentators, and perhaps also of the president himself, is shifting to questions of legacy. What went well, what badly, and will history be a sympathetic judge. This, at least, seems a reasonable reflection of the current state of American politics. Whereas previously President Bush easily commanded the attention of the global media, now he competes with the presidential candidates for air time. What now interests people in the US and the world is what the new post-Bush America will look like. Only a few years ago Bush's impact on American and world politics was frequently presented as deeply systemic, with the language of the war on terror and proclamations that 9/11 had changed the world contributing to this sense of structural transformation. Today, however, the presidential candidates compete by emphasising the mistakes of the past and that they will do things differently. In short, whether or not the Bush Administration has had a deep structural impact on global politics now appears more debatable.
In contrast, comment on Russian politics differs in at least three respects. Third, this also points to that claims of structural change may actually be better supported in the Russian, than in the American, case. The difficulty, however, becomes over agreeing what these structural changes are. For some (particularly in the Western media) Putin's legacy is likely to be written in terms of his undermining of democracy and a return to authoritarian trends, whilst globally he is often seen as pushing Russia in a revisionist direction, asserting the continued relevance of the balance of power and a much more guarded attitude towards the West. For others, Putin's centralising reforms are seen as a prerequisite for a properly democratic and coherent state, whilst internationally he is seen as a pragmatist who has reclaimed Russia's power and voice on the world stage and in this process restored pride to Russian nationhood and identity.
The articles in this special issue are thus aimed at analysing different aspects of Putin's legacy and project. More particularly, they ask what implications aspects of Putin's legacy may have for the West. Whilst these mainly relate to the development of West-Russia relations, in this introductory article I argue that elements of Putin's project are likely to have a profound and enduring impact on how the West constitutes itself and approaches the rest of the world more generally. This is interesting in that despite a general tendency in the West to pay only lip service to Russian interests since the end of the Cold War as a result of its perceived declining power, this article suggests that whilst Russia has frequently been cast as increasingly marginal it retains considerable ability to impact on the West. Theoretically, therefore, the article builds on the insights of a growing literature highlighting the power of the outside and the margins to impact on and shape the nature of the core.
2 There are different ways in 2 For different takes on the power of margins see: Noel Parker (ed.) The Geopolitics of Europe's which the outside/margins can do this, but of specific concern here is the power that the outside/margins can wield by either granting or withholding recognition to the claims of the core.
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The theoretical aspects of the paper will be developed in more detail below. 
Putin's Project and IR Theory
Relations between the West and Russia have fluctuated since the end of the Cold War.
At times, as in the early 1990s or immediately after 9/11, the relationship has been Geopolitical thinking, however, has also been ascribed more positive elements. As Bassin and Aksenov note, whereas historically geopolitics has lacked any real status as an academic discipline in Russia, today it plays a much more important role. This is evident in the establishment of a permanent Committee for Geopolitical Analysis in the Duma and the fact that geopolitical ideas have been broadly embraced within the political elite.
14 For example, prominent intellectuals like Gennadii Zyuganov and Aleksandr Dugin have reclaimed Harold Mackinder as a source of intellectual inspiration. In this respect Mackinder's "designation of the Heartland as the 'pivot of history' becomes an affirmation of the absolute pre-eminence and centrality of Russia itself throughout modern world history". 15 In this instance, therefore, geopolitics is seen to resurrect Russia from its marginality. What such geopolitical analysis also does, however, is generate a preoccupation with affirming borders and spheres of influence, while also feeding identity discourses proclaiming Russia's difference from the West and its distinctive civilisational traits.
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Arguably, Putin's position has been more sophisticated. Such views seem to call for irreconcilable opposition towards the West, the assertion of Russia's exclusive control over the Heartland and arguably promote a mercantilist economic vision opposed to free trade and globalising economic linkages. 17 Putin's position on each of these is rather ambiguous. As noted below, Putin's construction of Russian identity in relation to the West is not one of outright rejection. However, another good example is energy policy. The key point is that whilst in the West Russia has frequently been accused of wielding energy as a geopolitical instrument (by allegedly hiking prices in Ukraine, 14 Mark Bassin and Konstantin E. Aksenov (2006) Belarus and Georgia in order to influence local politics) a different interpretation is also available. As Makarychev notes in this volume, charging its neighbours market prices could be viewed as an inherently normalising move, indeed, the antithesis of previous practices whereby geopolitically important neighbours received preferential treatment. By contrast, though, a geopolitical/geoeconomic logic has clearly been evident in the emphasis Putin has placed on energy as the fundamental source of Russian claims to a great power status.
This indicates a more general tension in Putin's Russia whereby Russia aspires to be accepted as both a 'normal state' and 'great power'. Secrieru conceptualises this as a tension in Russian foreign policy between a desire for integration in the international community (enabling it to assert its normalness) and a desire for isolation premised on carving out a sphere of influence as a basis of claims to being a great power. 18 This tension between being treated concurrently as equal and exceptional helps explain how realist and geopolitical frames of reference are variously avoided and endorsed in Russian rhetoric and contributes to what sometimes seems an overly suspicious attitude towards organisations like NATO and the EU. In its quest for acceptance and normalcy Russia is drawn towards such institutions and to developing strategic partnerships with them, but is also repelled by concerns that too close a relationship will undermine its influence and great power status. The fear is that Russia will become just another 'normal power', whereas Russia aspires to be a 'normal great power' with room for manoeuvre. of European integration, the downplaying of borders and the dispersal of sovereignty, for Putin enhancing Russian sovereignty has been a core value and goal. Putin's argument is that the failures of the 1990s resulted from the disintegration of the state and its appropriation by oligarchs, which undermined the state's capacity for autonomous action. As such, Putin argues enhancing sovereignty and reclaiming modernist state power is central to enhancing democracy in Russia. Putin's point is that whilst democracy is not perfect in Russia, but is a work in progress, so is it in the West. The problem with the West is its habit of lecturing to others without listening to their criticisms in turn, a habit which smacks of arrogance. 42 As Putin expressed it in Portugal in May 2007: "let's not see the situation as one side being white, clean, and pure, while the other side is some kind of 'monster' that has only just crawled out of the forest, with hoofs and horns instead of a normal human appearance". 48 the important point is that the ENP's normative agenda is set by the EU beforehand, all that is required of the neighbours is that they endorse this agenda.
Haukkala contends that by refusing to submit to such a subordinate relationship, and refusing participation in the ENP, Russia has fundamentally dented the EU's aspirations to establish itself as a regional normative hegemon. In contrast, Russia has insisted on a more equal relationship with the EU as framed through the EU-Russia strategic partnership and the project of developing the four Common Spaces. Given
Russia's aspirations to be treated as a great power this is hardly surprising. In Haukkala's view Russia's assertion of its sovereignty, great power status and emphasis on equality has questioned the feasibility of Russia's normative convergence with the EU. This again raises questions about the prospects of moving towards a more solidarist international society with Russia.
There is, however, another possibility, where Russia's rejection of the ENP could be seen as marking the end of EU idealism in its relations with Russia in favour of a more pragmatic approach that in turn indicates that Russia's recalcitrance is having an important impact on the EU's own self-constitution in its relations with Russia. Put provocatively, the suggestion is that Russia has been successful in its aspiration to 
Conclusion
This article has tried to show how Putin's project has had important implications for the West in terms of policy formulation and the construction of identity. In conclusion I would suggest these impacts are likely to be enduring. To summarise, whilst in the West there has been a tendency to try and ignore Russia as a result of its perceived declining power, ultimately this has not been possible. While Russia is obviously not as powerful as the Soviet predecessor it still has enough resources (symbolic, political, economic) to unsettle Western policies and ambitions. Putin's articulation of a great power project for Russia premised on emphasising its independence and links in all directions, rather than opting submissively for a Western orientation, has simply illuminated this fact.
Ultimately, fundamental to Russia's ability to impact on the West, and the aspect of Putin's contribution in this sense is in exposing the limits of the West's claims to normative power and in this sense highlighting that history is far from over.
